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this	 situation	 firmly	 at	 the	 feet	 of	 postmodernism.	 As	 Bruno	 Tertrais	 contends,	
‘postmodernism	 and	 French	 intellectuals	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 “post-truth”	 and	 “alt-facts”’	
(2017).	Highly-esteemed	historian,	Richard	 J.	Evans,	also	 felt	 compelled	 to	 tweet:	 ‘If	 I	am	
wrong,	and	postmodernist	disbelief	in	truth	didn’t	lead	to	our	post-truth	age,	then	how	do	
we	 explain	 the	 current	 disdain	 for	 facts?’	 (2017).	 And	 consider	 the	 now	 commonplace	
emphatic	tone	of	headlines	such	as	 ‘Elon	Musk's	big	battery	brings	reality	crashing	into	a	











real	 is	particularly	prescient.	 I	will	 focus	specifically	upon	 this	 fascination	and	 the	rise	of	
the	general	 imperative	of	being	in	synch	with	reality	across	four	areas	of	Baudrillard:	the	
critique	 of	 the	 commodity	 form,	 the	 rise	 of	 objective	 reality,	 hyperreality,	 and	 integral	
reality.	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 Baudrillard	 provides	 us	 with	 a	 means	 for	 adequately	
understanding	 and	 engaging	 with	 the	 current	 post-truth	 scandal.	 I	 will	 offer	 a	
Baudrillardian	 take	upon	post-truth	 and	Trumpism,	 as	 it	 has	been	 constructed	 in	media.	
This	take	focuses	upon	the	conditions	for	the	rise	of	Trumpism	and	post-truth.	My	claim	is	
that	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 present	media	 scandal	 is	 not	 to	 be	 found	 in	 a	 lack	 of	 reality,	 the	
notion	that	there	is	not	enough	reality	in	play;	it	is	to	be	found	in	the	overproduction	of	a	
surplus	 reality	 that	veers	out	of	 control	 into	hitherto	unknown	 forms	of	 absurdity,	or,	 in	
Baudrillard’s	 terms,	 into	 integral	 reality.	 ‘The	 real	 does	 not’,	 Baudrillard	 tells	 us,	 ‘efface	
itself	 in	 favour	of	 the	 imaginary;	 it	 effaces	 itself	 in	 favour	of	 the	more	 real	 than	 real:	 the	
hyperreal’	 (Baudrillard	1990b,	11),	 and,	ultimately,	 integral	 reality.	 In	 a	 reversal	of	what	
might	be	considered	to	be	common	sense	logic,	the	problem	of	Trumpism	and	post-truth	is	
not	that	reality	is	diminishing,	it	is	that	there	is	too	much.	
I	would	have	to	admit	that	 if	 the	aforementioned	pundits	and	intellectuals	are	right,	 then	
surely	 Baudrillard’s	 work	 should	 be	 abandoned	 at	 once.	 After	 all,	 is	 he	 not	
postmodernism’s	 high	 priest!	 (Miles	 2001,	 86).	 But	 what	 better	 description	 could	 be	
offered	for	this	‘post-truth’	crisis	other	than	Baudrillard’s	point	about	the	surplus	of	reality,	
and	 that	 the	 ‘reality	of	 the	world	 is	…	a	reassuring	hypothesis’	 that	 ‘dominates	our	value	
system	today’	(2008,	48).	The	laughter	at	and	against	‘Trumpism’,	which	animates	much	of	
the	 aforementioned	 Twitter	 storm,	 confidently	 asserts	 that	 there	 is	 a	 clear	 difference	
between	 objective	 knowledge	 and	 speculative	 constructions.	 For	 objective	 thinking,	
speculative	 ideas	 are	 dangerous.	 Knowledge	 of	 reality	 as	 it	 actually	 is,	 that	 is	 facts	 piled	
upon	 facts,	 provides	 a	 bedrock	 of	 security	 against	 this	 danger.	 As	 the	 well-known	
astrophysicist,	Neil	deGrasse	Tyson,	puts	it,	in	an	echo	of	Martin	Luther	King,	‘I	dream	of	a	
world	where	 the	 truth	 is	what	shapes	people’s	politics,	 rather	 than	politics	shaping	what	
people	think	is	true’	(2017).	
It	 is	 precisely	 Trumpism’s	 lack	 of	 objectivity	 that	 is	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 this	 public	 scorn	
(Swaine	 2017).	 The	 problem	 is	 that	 in	 the	 post-truth	 situation	 objective	 facts	 about	 the	
world	are	less	influential	than	feelings,	beliefs,	and	personal	opinions	(Institute	on	equality	









The Reality Compulsion 
What	is	interesting	about	Trumpism	is	that	the	surrounding	scandal	is	unexceptional.	It	is	
unexceptional	 because	 the	 language	 of	 reality	 has	 begun	 to	 engulf	 us.	 From	 the	 rise	 of	
reality	 television,	 to	 the	 political	 claim	 that	 ‘real	 Australians	 say	 welcome’	 to	 refugees	





chicken	 stock.	Yet	 it	 is	 curious	 that	 the	 claim	 to	be	 real	has	 such	a	widespread	purchase	
across	 media	 culture	 and	 politics.	 This	 fascination	 with	 reality	 is	 expressed	 in	 the	
enthusiasm	for	the	authentic	over	the	fake,	the	natural	instead	of	the	synthetic,	objectivity	
as	 opposed	 to	 feelings,	 use	 value	 over	 exchange	 value,	 and	 scientific	 truth	 rather	 than	
political	 ideology.	 Even	 though	 this	 is	 a	 diverse	 list	 of	 oppositions,	 each	 has	 a	 common	
element.	Each	claim	that	it	is	imperative	to	access	the	real	thing	or	situation.	The	real	thing	
insulates	us	 from	evil,	 saves	us	 from	wrestling	with	uncertainty,	 and	guarantees	 that	 the	
social	 order	 remains	 as	 it	 should	 be.	 Isness	 is	 immediate	 rather	 than	 mediated,	 and	 is	
considered	 to	 be	 that	 fully	 revealed	 ‘outside’	 that	 is	 completely	 independent	 from	 the	
representations	that	disclose	it.	The	current	fascination	with	reality	is	thus	a	contemporary	
version	of	naive	realism	that	now	takes	the	form	of	a	social	and	political	imperative.		
It	 is	 precisely	 a	 fascination	 with	 authenticity,	 or	 the	 truth	 of	 reality	 that	 makes	 any	
commodity	 genuine	 and	 any	 political	 claim	 formidable.	 The	 latter	 Freud	 of	 ‘Beyond	 the	
pleasure	 principle’	 perhaps	 provides	 an	 apt	 basis	 for	 this	 fascination	 with	 what	 is.	
Trumpism’s	 assault	 upon	 reality	 has	 engendered	 a	 sense	 of	 loss	 and,	 perhaps,	 trauma.	
Alderson’s	concern	about	the	genuineness	of	the	sport	commodity	also	betrays	a	sense	of	
possible	 loss.	We	can	 thus	read	 the	Twitter	storm	around	Trump,	with	 its	expressions	of	
unpleasure,	disbelief,	and	(re)assertion	of	 the	realness	of	reality,	as	a	 form	of	compulsive	
behaviour.	 Freud	 found	 in	 the	 unpleasures	 of	 the	 repetition-compulsion	 a	 serious	
theoretical	 problem.	 While	 ‘there	 exists’,	 Freud	 writes,	 ‘in	 the	 mind	 a	 strong	 tendency	





principle	 in	 doubt,	 as	 I	 read	 it,	 Freud	 promptly	 set	 about	 showing	 how	 the	 repetition-
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compulsion	 relates	 to,	 and	 is	 constantly	 reinforced	 by,	 factors	 governed	 by	 the	 pleasure	
principle.	In	one	well-known	instance,	the	repetition-compulsion	is	staged	as	a	function	of	




Trump’s	 despicable	 postmodernism	must	 be	 stopped!	 However,	 Baudrillard	 complicates	
this	 compulsive	 process.	 Rather	 than	 the	 loss	 of	 reality,	 which	 results	 in	 the	
aforementioned	fort-da	game	of	mastery,	the	present	situation	is	not	that	of	loss,	it	is,	as	I	
have	suggested,	 that	of	excess.	The	aforementioned	examples	reveal	 the	drive	that	marks	
our	time	to	valorise	everything	that	 is	real.	The	world	 is	sorted	 into	the	categories	of	 the	
desirable	 and	 real	 and	 the	 less	 desirable	 and	 less	 real.	 This	 sorting	 —	 Is	 Trump	 truly	
presidential?	—	takes	 the	 form	of	a	panic.	 ‘We	seem	to	be	driven’,	Baudrillard	maintains,	
‘by	 a	 huge	 and	 irresistible	 compulsion	 that	 acts	 on	 us	 through	 the	 very	 progress	 of	 our	
technologies	...	—	a	compulsion	to	draw	ever	closer	to	the	unconditional	realization	of	the	
real’	 (2000,	65).	 	We	might	 thus	say	 that	 this	current	 fascination	has	 less	 to	do	with	 loss	





suggested,	we	are	 faced	with	 the	absurd	situation	 in	which	all	 interlocutors	and	political	
opponents	stake	their	claim	upon	the	bedrock	of	the	real.	Both	Trump	and	his	detractors	
make	precisely	 this	claim.	Both	claim	they	are	 the	real	America!	 If	we	 follow	Baudrillard,	
the	 crucial	 question	 here	 is,	 as	 I	 have	 suggested:	 what	 conditions	 have	 produced	 this	
absurd	 situation?	 Baudrillard’s	 claim	 is	 that	 current	 political	 and	 social	 phenomena	
demand	to	be	understood	and	responded	to	in	terms	of	the	meaning	making	logic	in	which	
they	are	produced.	In	the	most	rudimentary	of	terms,	his	position	is	that	there	has	been	a	
profound	 and	 elusive	 shift	 in	 the	 configuration	 of	 the	 real	 across	 time	 (even	 the	 term,	
‘reality’,	itself	is	one	of	these	effects).		
I	 want	 to	 turn	 now	 to	methodically	 trace	 Baudrillard’s	 engagement	with	 the	 fascination	
with	reality	across	his	work.	The	aim	here	is	twofold.	Firstly,	I	aim	to	show	that	the	roots	of	
post-truth	 and	 Trumpism	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 ongoing	 intensification	 of	 the	 West’s	
fascination	 with	 what	 is	 real.	 And	 secondly,	 I	 aim	 to	 show	 what	 a	 Baudrillardian	
perspective	contributes	to	our	understanding	of	the	current	post-truth	situation.	We	need	
to	consider	 four	critiques	of	reality’s	production:	 the	critique	of	 the	commodity	 form,	 the	















The Authentic Commodity 
One	of	Baudrillard’s	earliest	forays	into	the	fascination	with	reality	comes	in	the	form	of	a	
critique	of	Marx’s	theory	of	the	commodity	(the	context	in	which	Baudrillard’s	early	work	
is	 formed).	What	 is	 at	 issue	 for	Baudrillard	 is	Marx’s	 appeal	 to	 an	authentic	outside	as	 a	
means	 to	 critique	 the	 inauthentic	 commodity	of	 capitalist	 exchange.	Marx	doesn’t	 escape	
being	fascinated	with	reality.	For	Marx,	use-value	refers	to	 ‘the	physical	properties	of	 the	
commodity’	 (Marx	 1990,	 126)	 that	 satisfies	 social	 needs,	 and	 ‘the	 exchange	 relation	 of	
commodities	is	characterised	precisely	by	its	abstraction	[in	the	form	of	money]	from	their	
use-values’	 (127).	 Abstraction	 is	 a	 problem,	 for	Marx,	 because	 in	 capitalist	 societies	 the	
production	 of	 useful	 commodities	 is	 eclipsed	 by	 the	 production	 of	 commodities	 for	




production	 of	 surplus	 value	 rather	 than	 actual	 usefulness.	 Against	 the	 claims	 of	 political	




to	 meet	 their	 objective	 needs.	 Use-value	 is	 clearly	 in	 an	 antagonistic	 relationship	 with	
exchange	value.		
Baudrillard	problematises	Marx’s	appeal	here	 to	 the	real	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	usefulness	of	
the	 commodity.	 He	 claims	 Marx’s	 critique	 of	 the	 commodity	 does	 little	 to	 disrupt	








socially	necessary	 labour.	For	Adam	Smith,	as	 it	 is	 for	Marx,	water	and	shelter	have	very	
little	 exchangeable	 value	 but	 are	 very	 useful	 commodities.	 These	 are	 indisputably	
necessary	 for	 life.	 Diamonds,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 serve	 no	 practical	 utility	 but	 are	more	
valuable	 precisely	 because	 they	 are	 exchangeable	 for	 other	 commodities	 (1776,	 Book	 I,	
Chapter	V).	 The	 key	 point	 is	 that	 there	 clearly	 is	 a	 distinction	 between	 value	 in	 use	 and	
value	 in	exchange.	From	Smith’s	perspective,	 this	means	 if	you	want	 to	make	money	you	
had	 better	 sell	 diamonds	 or	 some	 other	 exchangeable	 commodity.	 From	 Marx’s	
perspective,	the	aim	to	sell	exchangeable	commodities	is	precisely	the	problem	since,	as	I	
have	stated,	workers	end	up	being	alienated	from	the	means	of	production.		
It	 could	 also	 be	 countered	 that	when	Marx	 is	 read	 in	 relation	 to	 Lacan,	 such	 as	 in	 Samo	
Tomšič’s	 The	 Capitalist	 Unconscious	 (2015),	 use-value	 should	 not	 be	 understood	 as	
antagonistic	to	abstract	exchange	and	alienation.	Instead,	use	value	is	post	facto	posited	by	
the	 symbolic,	 and	as	 such	 serves	as	 a	 generator	of	production.	For	Marx,	 in	 this	 reading,	
production	 always	 produces	 a	 surplus	 in	 excess	 of	 usefulness,	 even	 when	 in	 its	 most	
natural	 state.	 Capitalism	 frees	 the	 productive	 forces	 and	 is,	 in	 Marx’s	 view,	 a	 gateway	
toward	 communism.	Baudrillard's	point,	 however,	 is	 that	 in	 the	 current	 techno-capitalist	
West	 the	 division	 between	 usefulness	 and	 exchangeability	 is	 difficult	 to	 define.	 This	 has	
less	to	do	with	post	facto	use	value	than	with	the	loss	of	the	clear	distinction	between	use	
and	 exchange	 value.	 Despite	 Tomšič’s	 inversion	 of	 the	 standard	 reading	 of	 Marx,	 in	 his	
reading	 use	 value	 remains	 as	 an	 alibi	 for	 production.	 Baudrillard	 argues	 that	 capitalist	
simulation	disturbs	this	relation.		
Consider	 a	 basic	 commodity	 such	 as	 drinking	 water.	 In	 the	 techno-capitalist	 West	 a	





its	 extraordinary	 source	—	 a	 protected	 artesian	 aquifer	 found	 deep	 underground	 in	 the	
remote	Fiji	Islands’	(Fiji	Water®).	Leaving	aside	the	exoticism	that	underpins	such	claims	
(see	Connell	2006),	 this	necessary	 commodity	 is	 an	example	of	usefulness	 that	 takes	 the	
form	of	 exchangeability.	 Fiji	Water®	 is	 an	 elite	 commodity	which,	 as	 Jones,	Murray,	 and	
Overton	point	out,	abounds	with	‘celebrity	endorsements	–	reaching	as	high	as	[former]	US	
President	 Barack	 Obama’	 (2017,	 112).	 This	 elite	 status	 derives,	 in	 large	 part,	 from	 the	
assumption	 that	 Fiji	Water®	 is	more	 real	 than	 ordinary	 water.	 The	 rather	 rudimentary	





form	no	 longer	works	 in	 the	 sense	 outlined	by	Marx.	 Boltanski	 and	Chiapello	 argue	 that	
capitalism	 responded	 to	 the	 1960s	 demand	 for	 liberation	 from	 the	 standardised	
commodity	of	industrial	capital	with	‘products	that	were	“authentic”	and	“differentiated”	in	
such	a	way	that	the	impression	of	massification	would	be	dispelled’	(2005,	442).	To	‘earn	
the	 label	 “authentic”’,	 they	 continue,	 ‘these	 goods	 must	 be	 drawn	 from	 outside	 the	
commodity	 sphere,	 from	 the	 “sources	 of	 authenticity”’.	 The	 ‘authentic	 thus	 assumes	
reference	to	an	original	that	is	not	a	commodity	good,	but	a	use-value	defined	in	a	unique	




In	 this	 account	 of	 the	 commodity	 form,	 use-value	 is	 drawn	 from	 an	 original	 outside	 to	
authenticate	the	product	in	relation	to	the	user.	Continental	chicken	stock,	for	instance,	is	
genuine	 since	 it	 is	made	 from	 real	 rather	 than	 synthetic	 chicken,	 and	 the	 user	 is	 able	 to	
express	their	socially	defined	skillfulness	in	cooking	authentic	dishes.	Use-value	is	thus	an	
outside	 that	 underpins	 the	 commodity’s	 exchange-value.	 If	 we	 follow	 Boltanski	 and	
Chiapello,	the	antagonistic	relation	between	use-value	and	exchange-value	that	was	crucial	
for	 Marx	 has	 thus	 collapsed.	 Under	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	 new	 spirit	 of	 capitalism,	 the	





final	 relation	 of	 intrinsic	 purpose	 ...	 which	 does	mask	 itself	 and	whose	 transparency,	 as	




destination	 and	purpose’	 (1981,	 132).	 In	 other	words,	 needs	 themselves,	what	 counts	 as	
need,	cannot	be	separated	from	the	social	system	that	produces	them.	This	is	precisely	why	
a	 value	 in	 use,	 such	 as	 water,	 directly	 links	 with	 abstract	 value	 in	 exchange.	 ‘To	 be	
abstractly	 and	 generally	 exchangeable’,	 Baudrillard	 explains,	 ‘products	 must	 also	 be	
thought	and	rationalised	in	terms	of	utility’	(131).	Fiji	Water®	is	thought	and	rationalised	
as	 a	 pristine	 natural	 substance	 that	 is	 more	 authentic	 than	 tap	 water.	 Consider	 this	
branding:	
Tropical	rain	falls.	Purified	by	equatorial	trade	winds.	
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In	a	pristine	rain	forest.	Surrounded	by	ancient,	dormant	volcanoes.	
Slowly	 filtered	 by	 volcanic	 rock.	 It	 gathers	 minerals	 and	 electrolytes	 that	
create	Fiji’s	soft,	smooth	taste.	
Collecting	 in	 a	 natural	 artesian	 aquifer.	 Protected	 and	 preserved	 from	
external	elements	until	you	unscrew	the	cap	(Fiji	Water®).	
Here	 the	 utility	 of	 nature	 is	 fetishised.	 Fiji	 Water’s®	 natural	 authenticity	 and	 its	







Marx,	 Baudrillard	 (provocatively)	 contends	 that	 he	 falls	 into	 the	 trap	 of	 assuming	 that	
reality	serves	as	a	ground	for	political	change.	In	this	way	of	thinking,	capitalist	exchange	is	
less	real	 than	 the	materiality	of	utility	and	social	conditions	of	 the	working	class.	Politics	
thus	 involves	 confronting	 capitalist	 abstractions	 with	 this	 material	 reality	 (today	 this	
politics	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 ‘speaking	 truth	 to	 power’).	 Baudrillard	 is	 arguing	 that	 Marx’s	
thinking	misrecognises	 the	 political	 problem,	 and	 can	 only	 provide	 a	 limited	 critique	 of	
capitalism.	Objective	use-values	form	the	basis	for	both	Marx’s	critique	and	for	capitalism’s	




our	 revolutionary	 strategies	 is	 to	 believe	 that	 we	 will	 put	 an	 end	 to	 the	
system	on	the	plane	of	the	real:	this	is	their	imaginary,	imposed	on	them	by	
the	system	itself,	living	or	surviving	only	by	always	leading	those	who	attack	
the	 system	 to	 fight	 amongst	 each	 other	 on	 the	 terrain	 of	 reality,	which	 is	
always	the	reality	of	the	system.	(1993a,	36)	
The	struggle	envisioned	by	Marx	takes	place	on	the	terrain	of	reality	that	is	already	laid	out	
in	 advance.	 On	 this	 terrain,	 resistance	 is	 absorbed	 and,	 quite	 possibly,	 even	 strengthens	
capitalism’s	 grip.	 At	 any	 rate,	 as	 capitalism	 has	 become	 more	 deeply	 entrenched,	 the	
absorption	of	resistance	now	seems	to	be	more	fully	developed	(Fisher	2009,	Bloom	2016).	









Simulation 1: Objective Reality and Its Effects 
The	 notion	 of	 reality,	 of	 the	 this	 is	 real	 rather	 than	 invented,	 coincides	 with	 the	
development	of	objective	thought	(as	opposed	to	abstract	belief).	Objectivity	is,	of	course,	a	
difficult	 term	 to	 pin	 down.	 Objectivity	 in	 everyday	 life	 works	 in	 different	 ways	 from	
objectivity	in	the	science	laboratory,	or	in	politics	and	art.	There	are	also	several	competing	
and	overlapping	concepts	of	objectivity:	as	 judgement	 free	 from	prejudice	(Simmel	1950,	
402-408),	 as	 judgement	 free	 from	 prior	 assumptions	 (Dworkin	 1996),	 as	 a	 necessary	
condition	 or	 instrumental	 set	 of	 established	 procedures	 for	 testing	 hypotheses	 (Popper	
1959),	 or	 as	 accurate	 representations	 (Russell	 1971,	 129).	 Nevertheless,	 despite	 these	
differences,	which	hinge	upon	the	problem	of	how	reality	can	be	accurately	apprehended,	
the	 realness	 of	 reality	 itself	 is	 rarely	 questioned.	 Today	 there	 is	 no	 doubt	 at	 all	 that	 the	
objective	and	discoverable	world	exists	outside	systems	of	representation.		
The	 lampooning	 of	 Trumpism,	 for	 instance,	 seems	 to	 strike	 a	 chord	 with	 17th	 Century	
philosophers	such	as	Descartes,	 for	whom	objective	truth	 is	a	straightforward	matter.	He	
writes,	 ‘I	 have	 never	 had	 any	 doubts	 about	 truth,	 because	 it	 seems	 a	 notion	 so	
transcendentally	 clear	 that	 nobody	 can	be	 ignorant	 of	 it	 ...	 the	word	 “truth”,	 in	 the	 strict	
sense,	 denotes	 the	 conformity	 of	 thought	 with	 its	 object’	 (1991,	 AT	 II	 597).	 Descartes	
development	of	 the	 foundations	of	epistemic	certainty	was	a	key	aspect	of,	as	Toni	Negri	






For	 Baudrillard,	 however,	 objective	 reality,	 is	 not	 as	 straightforward	 as	 it	 appears.	
Following	 Hannah	 Arendt,	 he	 claims	 objective	 reality	 is	 a	 product	 of	 the	modern	 age.	 It	
emerges	‘with	the	invention	of	an	Archimedean	point	outside	the	world	(on	the	basis	of	the	
invention	 of	 the	 telescope	 by	 Galileo	 and	 the	 discovery	 of	 modern	 mathematical	
calculation)	by	which	the	natural	world	is	definitively	alienated’	(Baudrillard	2009,	10).	At	
this	point	in	history,	it	became	possible	to	understand	knowledge	as	a	distinct	entity	from	
both	 the	material	world	 of	 nature	 and	 from	 subjective	 influences	 such	 as	 our	 emotions,	
needs,	and	desires.	Donna	Haraway	calls	this	Archimedian	point,	this	view	from	nowhere,	
‘the	 god	 trick’	 (1988,	 587).	 And	 in	 Foucault’s	 account	 of	 the	 rise	 of	 ‘man’	 and	 modern	
science,	 the	Archimedean	outside	 allowed	power	 to	 hide	 behind	objective	 knowledge.	 In	




For	 his	 part,	 Baudrillard	 directly	 challenges	 the	 ontological	 certainty	 of	 objectivity.	 He	
asserts:	
the	world	…	 is	 never	what	 it	 seems.	 It	 presents	 itself	 as	 one	 thing,	 but	 it’s	
something	else	…	the	world	plays	with	us,	 in	a	manner	of	speaking,	and	we	
have	 a	 subjective	 illusion	 —	 the	 illusion	 of	 being	 a	 subject.	 Whereas	 the	
objective	 illusion	derives	 from	the	 fact	 that	 the	world	presents	 itself	as	one	
thing,	but	it	is	not	really	this	at	all.	(1997a,	40)	
We	need	to	tread	carefully	here.	It	 is	possible	to	read	this	 idea	of	the	objective	illusion	of	
the	 world	 as	 Baudrillard	 claiming	 that	 the	 material	 world	 is	 merely	 a	 product	 of	 the	
imagination,	 or,	 in	 his	 terminology,	 simulation	 and	 simulacra.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 claim	
would	be	 there	are	no	objects	 to	be	discovered	outside	of	our	cultural	 constructions	and	
systems	 of	 representation.	 The	world	 thus	 consists	 of	mere	 simulacra,	 that	 is,	 copies	 of	
copies	 of	 a	 reality	 that	 does	 not	 actually	 exist.	 It	 is	 precisely	 in	 terms	 of	 this	 denial	 of	
objective	reality	that	Sokal	and	Bricmont	claim	Baudrillard	is	one	of	those	‘French’	authors	
who	make	no	‘pretense	at	“scientificity”’,	and	whose	‘underlying	philosophy	(to	the	extent	
one	 can	 be	 discerned)	 tends	 toward	 irrationalism	 or	 nihilism’	 (1998,	 13).	 With	 his	
‘lackadaisical	attitude	 toward	scientific	 rigor’	 (1998,	207),	Baudrillard’s	work	 is	merely	a	
form	of	 ‘nonsense	 and	word	 games’	 that	 ‘displace[s]	 the	 critical	 and	 rigorous	 analysis	 of	
social	realities’	(206).	However,	contrary	to	such	denouncements,	and	others	that	claim	his	





a	 lesser	 extent,	with	Morton’s	 object	 orientated	ontology.	 Statements	 such	 as	 ‘Life	 forms	
recede	 into	 strangeness	 the	 more	 we	 think	 about	 them’	 (Morton	 2011,	 165)	 bear	 a	




‘not	 enough	 to	 make	 it	 true,	 since	 this	 relative	 coherence	 is	 only	 the	 paradoxical	
consequence	of	this	“ontological”	simplification’	(ibid.).	Objective	reality	is	thus	an	effect	of	






or	 that	objects	 can	be	studied	 (after	all,	he	does	make	statements	about	 the	world	 in	his	
books	and	photographs).	Ultimately	 though,	 the	question	of	whether	 things	exist	outside	
our	representations	or	not	is	banal	and	meaningless	(Baudrillard	2005,	39).	Brian	Massumi	
is,	 then,	 mistaken	 when	 he	 contends,	 ‘Baudrillard	 sidesteps	 the	 question	 of	 whether	
simulation	replaces	a	real	that	did	indeed	exist,	or	if	simulation	is	all	there	has	ever	been’	
(1987,	np).	Defending	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	 affirmation	of	both	 simulation	and	 the	 real	
beyond	 it,	 Massumi	 argues	 ‘simulation	 is	 a	 process	 that	 produces	 the	 real,	 or,	 more	
precisely,	a	more-than-real	on	the	basis	of	the	real.	“It	carries	the	real	beyond	its	principle	
to	the	point	where	it	is	effectively	produced”’	(ibid.).	In	this	reverse	of	the	Platonist	view	of	
simulation	 as	 an	 inferior	 copy	 of	 a	 real	 or	 original	 (which	 is	 how	 the	Wachowskis’	The	
Matrix	 conceives	 of	 it),	 for	 Deleuze	 ‘“real”	 entities	 are	 in	 fact	 undercover	 simulacra	 that	
have	consented	to	feign	being	copies’	(ibid.).	In	this	view,	simulacra	are	productive	entities.	
As	Deleuze	 in	The	Logic	of	Sense	puts	 it,	 ‘simulacrum	is	not	a	degraded	copy.	 It	harbors	a	
positive	 power	 which	 denies	 the	 original	 and	 the	 copy,	 the	 model	 and	 the	 reproduction’	
(1990,	262).		
If	 we	 follow	 Massumi,	 the	 problem	 with	 Baudrillard’s	 work	 on	 simulation	 is	 that	 it	 is	
impossible	 to	 determine	 if	 he	 is	 a	 vulgar	 Platonist	 or	 not.	 The	 assumption	 is	 that	
Baudrillard	 argues	 that	 simulations	 are	 a	 copy	 of	 an	 original	 real	 which	 has	 become	
simulacrum,	that	is,	a	mere	copy	of	a	copy	without	reference	to	an	original	real.	However,	
Baudrillard	 actually	 departs	 sharply	 from	 the	 Platonic	 treatment	 of	 simulation.	 In	 the	
much-cited	Simulacra	 and	 Simulation,	 this	 clear	 explanation	 is	 offered:	 ‘simulating	 is	 not	
pretending’	 (1994a,	 3).	This	 is	 precisely	because	pretending	 ‘or	dissimulating,	 leaves	 the	
principle	 of	 reality	 intact:	 the	 difference	 is	 always	 clear,	 it	 is	 simply	 masked,	 whereas	
simulation	 threatens	 the	difference	between	 the	 “true”	and	 the	 “false”,	 the	 “real”	and	 the	
“imaginary”’	 (ibid.).	 Baudrillard’s	 account	 of	 simulation	 thus	 bears	 a	 resemblance	 to	
Deleuze’s	 reverse	 Platonism,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 simulations	 trouble	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 original	 and	 copy,	 but	 rather	 than	 producing	 an	 incomplete	more-than-real	
reality	 (‘the	 actual’	 in	 relation	 to	 ‘the	 virtual’	 in	 Deleuze’s	 more	 developed	 conceptual	





dynamic	 object	 we	 are	 left	 with	 a	 passive,	 inert	 mass.	 Herein	 lies	 the	 key	 difference	
between	 Deleuze	 and	 Baudrillard.	 Deleuze’s	 dualism	 consists	 of	 the	 positive	 and	 yet	
incomplete	expression	of	the	virtual	dimension	of	reality	in	the	dimension	of	the	actual	(the	
object	 is	 thus	ambivalent).	Baudrillard’s	dualism,	or,	more	accurately,	duelism	 consists	of	
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the	 negative	 relation	 between	 reality	 and	 the	 world	 of	 illusion.	 For	 Baudrillard,	 the	
problem	with	simulations	is	that	they	negate	the	object.	Simulations	represent	an	outside	




[We]	 take	 from	 it	 its	 secret,	 arbitrary,	 accidental	 character,	 rid	 it	 of	
appearances	 and	 extract	 its	meaning,	 divert	 it	 from	 all	 predestination	 and	










atrocities,	 human	 suffering,	 resistance	 and	 social	 upheaval	 that	 characterise	 war	 (as	 a	
complex	object)	have	been	overwritten	by	 the	 slick	 simulations	of	 the	American	military	
machine.	The	object	thus	disappears.	Consider	the	more	recent	development	of	‘war	porn’,	
the	military	 footage	available	via	YouTube.	The	camera	 located	on	 the	Apache	helicopter	
captures	images	of	actual	air	strikes	upon	military	targets.	The	soundtrack	consists	of	the	
voices	 of	 pilots	 and	 operatives	 engaged	 in	 the	 formulaic	 language	 of	 battle,	 deliberating	
about	the	possible	identity	of	the	targets.	In	a	typical	example,	‘Apache	helicopters	take	out	
Taliban	fighters’	(Broadbent,	2017),	‘insurgents’	appear	as	pixelated	white	blobs	in	the	low	
resolution	 black	 and	 white	 image.	 In	 the	 later	 section,	 these	 blobs	 become	 engulfed	 in	
white	flashes	and	dust	as	the	‘hell	fire’	machine	gun	blasts	at	them.	Yet,	the	bloody	violence	
and	horror	of	this	scene	does	not	appear	on	screen.	 In	these	 images,	 the	suffering	people	
literally	 disappear	 beneath	 flashes	 of	 bright	 white	 and	 black	 pixels.	 As	 opposed	 to	 the	
requirements	 of	 accurate	 or	 realist	 representation,	 these	military	 images	 serve	 the	 dual	
purpose	of	high	functionality	and	low	information	(what	McLuhan	might	call	cool	media),	




we	accept	 the	proposition	 that	 reality	 is	 a	 simulation,	does	 this	mean,	 therefore,	 that	we	
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have	 no	 grounds	 to	 challenge	Donald	 Trump’s	 apparent	 disregard	 for	 facts?	 Can	we	 not	
question	propaganda,	fake	news,	and	campaigns	of	misinformation?	As	I	have	stated	above,	
Baudrillard	does	not	question	 the	veracity	of	 facts	 in	 themselves.	There	 is	nothing	 in	his	
thought	that	would	 invalidate	challenging	Trump’s	claims.	However,	 the	problem	is	more	
complex	 than	 simply	 combatting	 Trump	with	 the	 truth.	 Trump’s	 supporters	 are,	 in	 fact,	
quite	prepared	to	accept	that	his	claims	can	be	demonstrated	to	be	false,	yet	despite	this,	as	
Nyhan	et	al.’s	comprehensive	study	reveals,	they	support	him	anyway	(2017).	The	problem	
of	 Trumpism,	 from	 Baudrillard’s	 perspective	 as	 I	 see	 it,	 is	 thus	 not	 is	 Trump	 correct	 or	
incorrect	on	established	matters	of	fact	(a	banal	problem),	it	is	what	does	this	phenomenon	
tell	 us	 about	 the	 contemporary	 principle	 or	 concept	 of	 reality	 itself.	 It	would	 seem,	 as	 I	
suggested	at	the	outset	of	the	current	discussion,	that	reality	is	under	threat.	Therefore,	the	
problem	to	be	posed	is:	how	is	it	possible	that	reality	could	be	placed	under	such	strain?		
To	 find	 the	solution	 to	 this	problem	we	need	 to	 look	closely	at	 the	gigantic	enterprise	of	
disillusionment	and	 its	particular	effects.	Reality	 is	made	 real	via	 this	enterprise,	but	 the	
process	 of	 realisation	 also	 becomes	 an	 end	 in	 itself,	 so	 much	 so	 that	 the	 production	 of	
reality	spirals	out	of	control.	As	Baudrillard	argues:			




of	 the	 gigantic	 enterprise	 of	 disillusionment.	 Baudrillard	 tells	 us	 the	 reality	 hypothesis	
continues	to	be	propped	up,	though	in	less	than	straightforward	ways,	by	the	order	of	the	
hyperreal.	The	hyperreal	is	a	representational	logic	in	which	the	real	emerges	as	excess,	or	
more	 real	 than	 the	 real.	The	variation	 in	 this	 formulation	 from	Massumi’s	 formula	of	 the	
more-than-real	 is	 important.	 In	 contrast	 with	 Deleuze’s	 expressionist	 dualism,	 which	
consists,	 as	 I	 have	 stated,	 of	 the	 virtual	 and	 actual,	 Baudrillard	 posits	 the	 hyperreal,	
whereby	the	real	exceeds	its	own	principle	of	objectivity.	
	
Simulation 2: Hyperreality 
‘The	real	does	not’,	Baudrillard	 tells	us,	 ‘efface	 itself	 in	 favour	of	 the	 imaginary;	 it	effaces	
itself	in	favour	of	the	more	real	than	real:	the	hyperreal.	The	truer	than	true’	(1990b,	11).	
The	compulsive	fascination	with	authenticity	and	what	 is	real	becomes	hyperbolic	within	
the	 orders	 of	 the	 hyperreal.	 The	 hyperreal,	 or	 hyperbolic	 real,	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	
fascination	 with	 so-called	 superfoods,	 in	 the	 vitamin	 supplement	 that	 contains	 twelve	
oranges	worth	of	vitamin	C,	 in	so-called	 ‘life	hacks’,	 in	the	discourses	of	securitisation	(in	
which	 terrain	 is	 secured	and	made	predictable	 through	 the	application	of	predetermined	
schemas),	 in	 opinion	 polls,	 in	 the	 continual	 appeal	 to	 nature	 and	 the	 natural,	 and	 in	 the	
              MEDIANZ  Vol. 16, No. 2  2016 
 19 
authenticity	of	the	artist,	the	politician,	the	Italian	restaurant,	craft	beer,	and	so	on.	In	each,	
the	 ambivalent	 object	 disappears	 and	 is	 replaced	 by	 the	 calculable,	 meaningful,	 and	
profitable	object	form	of	late	capitalism.		
To	be	precise,	 the	 hyperreal	 is	 characterised	by	 the	 repetition-compulsion	 to	 perpetuate	
reality,	to	continually	realise	the	‘this	is’.	This	compulsion,	however,	unleashes	an	implosive	
logic.	 As	 reality	 is	 more	 and	more	 realised	 it	 becomes	 excessive	 and,	 paradoxically,	 the	
objectivity	 of	 reality	 (the	 reality	 principle)	 is	 cast	 aside.	 The	 crucial	 point	 is	 that	 in	 the	
hyperreal	 situation	 the	 referential	 outside,	 that	 objective	 representation	 both	 posits	 and	
aims	to	mirror,	is	folded	back	into	representation	itself.	Representation	no	longer	mirrors	
the	real.	At	 the	same	time,	 the	disappearance	of	 the	reality	principle	 is	concealed.	This	 is	
what	gives	rise	to	the	fascination	with	reality.	The	hyperreal	acts	as	though	the	loss	of	the	
reality	 principle	 has	 not	 happened.	 As	 Baudrillard	 puts	 it:	 the	 ‘terms	 “simulacra”	 [and]	
“simulation”	 ...	 summarise	 this	 liquidation	 [of	 every	 possible	 value],	 in	 which	 every	
signification	 is	 eliminated	 in	 its	 own	 sign,	 and	 the	 profusion	 of	 signs	 parodies	 a	 by	 now	
unobtainable	reality’	(2010,	35).	This	means	that	the	perfected	reality	of	the	hyperreal	can	
appear	 to	be	unheimlich	 [unhomely],	 to	use	 the	 language	of	Freud.	The	hyperreal	 can	be	
unsettling,	 and	 this	 is	 not	 because	 it	 is	 strange	 but	 rather	 because	 it	 is	 a	 reality	 that	 is	
experienced	 as	 genuine	 and	 real	 when	 it	 is	 merely	 a	 simulation.	 Hyperreality	 is	 too	
proximate	to	reality;	it	is	more	real	than	real.	
Exemplary	of	 this	 is	Peter	Weir’s	 film,	The	Truman	Show	(1998).	 It	would	be	tempting	to	
read	 the	 film	 as	 a	 cynical	 statement	 about	 the	 rise	 of	 reality	 TV,	 in	 which	 a	 producer,	
Christof	(Ed	Harris),	enslaves	an	unwitting	character,	Truman	Burbank	(Jim	Carey),	in	the	
constructed	 town	of	 Seahaven.	Unaware	he	 is	being	watched	by	millions	of	 viewers,	 and	
that	the	people	he	encounters	on	a	daily	basis	are	actors,	Truman	lives	what	he	thinks	is	an	
ordinary	 middle-class	 suburban	 life.	 The	 audience	 is	 fascinated	 by	 Truman’s	 authentic	
responses	 to	 the	highly	contrived	situations	he	encounters.	However,	a	moment	arises	 in	
which	it	occurs	to	Truman	that	the	reality	in	which	he	lives	seems	strange.	This	is	because	








world	 I	 created	 for	you’	 and,	 ‘you	 [Truman]	were	 real.	That’s	what	made	you	so	good	 to	




paradoxically,	 comes	 in	 the	 form	 of	 Truman	 being	 blissfully	 unaware	 of	 the	 simulated	
nature	of	 the	 town.	Christof’s	 plea	 reveals	 the	 truth	of	 the	 system.	Authenticity	does	not	





his	 presidency	 more	 real	 (as	 if	 there	 is	 such	 a	 dimension	 to	 pervert).	 CNN’s	 Dean	
Obeidallah	 misses	 the	 crucial	 point	 when	 he	 declares,	 ‘we	 deserve	 a	 president	 who	 is	
thoughtful,	 informed	and	 focused	on	working	 for	 all	Americans.	 Instead	we	have	Trump,	
who	 seems	 preoccupied	with	 creating	 a	 televised	 spectacle’	 (2017).	 The	 crucial	 point	 is	
that	 the	 televised	 spectacle	 has	 long	 been	 a	 key	 feature	 of	 the	 presidency.	What	 Trump	
reveals	 is	 the	 centrality	 of	 this	 spectacle.	 As	Baudrillard	points	 out,	 ‘all	 those	who	outdo	
themselves	 with	 arrogance	 (Le	 Pen),	 cynicism	 (Le	 Lay),	 pornography	 (Abu	 Ghraib),	





Žižek	 argues	 that	 contemporary	 capitalist	 culture	 is	 marked	 by	 the	 ideological	 slippage	




reality	 itself,	 of	what	 the	 people	 are	 doing.	What	 they	 do	 not	 know	 is	 that	
their	 social	 reality	 itself,	 their	 activity,	 is	 guided	 by	 the	 illusion	 which	 is	
structuring	their	reality,	 their	real	social	activity.	They	know	very	well	how	
things	really	are,	but	still	they	are	doing	as	if	they	did	not	know.	(ibid.)	
This	 is	why	belief,	Žižek	maintains,	 is	crucial.	Subjects	within	capitalism	tend	 to	consider	




way.	They	know	Trump	 is	 factually	 incorrect	yet	 they	support	him	anyway!	Fetishisation	
produces	 strange	 phenomena	 such	 as	 coffee	 without	 caffeine,	 nutrition	 without	 food,	
exercise	 equipment	 that	 produces	 no	 pain,	 household	 cleaning	 products	 that	 eliminate	
work,	a	president	without	a	political	career,	and	so	on.	The	crucial	point	is	that	substances,	






political	 action	 that	 produces	 substantive	 change,	 subjects	 prefer,	 it	 would	 seem,	
expressing	political	opinion	through	social	media.	Here	agency	is	displaced	onto	the	social	




Trump	 is	 a	 fetishised	object.	We	might	 thus	 say,	 along	with	Peter	Gordon,	 that	Trump	 is	
‘just	another	name	 for	 the	culture	 industry’	 (2017,	52).	This	means	 ‘Trumpism,	 though	 it	
masquerades	 as	 society’s	 rebellion	 against	 its	 own	 unfreedom,	 represents	 not	 an	 actual	
rebellion	 but	 the	 standardization	 of	 rebellion’	 (ibid.).	 The	 standarization	 of	 rebellion	
manifests	 in	 the	 ‘punchy	 sound	 bites	 [of	 journalists]	 and	 outraged	 tweets,	 and	 the	
polarised,	 standardised	 reflection	 of	 opinion	 into	 forms	 of	 humor	 and	 theatricalised	
outrage	within	narrow	niche	markets’	(50).	Trumpism	is	thus	fetishisation	par	excellence.		
Just	 as	 decaffeinated	 coffee	 is	 coffee	 without	 caffeine,	 social	 media	 and	 other	 forms	 of	
opinion,	 are	 democratic	 expressions	 without	 politics.	 Žižek	 thus	 usefully	 points	 to	 the	
detrimental	 ideological	 effects	 of	 the	 compulsion	 for	 objects	 to	 be	meaningful,	 but,	 from	
Baudrillard’s	 perspective,	 this	 does	not	 go	 far	 enough.	 If	 for	 Žižek	 a	 political	 unreality	 is	
produced	 through	 the	 fetishism	 of	 the	 interpassive	 subject,	 for	 Baudrillard	 the	 seeming	
unreality	 of	 politics	 is	 a	 feature	 of	 hyperreality.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 the	 problem	 of	
decaffeinated	coffee,	 if	we	use	 this	as	an	exemplar,	 is	 less	 that	 it	 is	a	 fetishised	copy	of	a	
post	 facto	 original,	 as	 it	 is	 for	 Žižek,	 than	 this	 coffee	 unsettles	 this	 relationship.	 The	 key	
point	 is	 that	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 real	 and	 copy	 results	 from	 the	 representational	 system	
drawn	 up	 around	 the	 commodity	 form.	 The	 consumer	 thus	 drinks,	 as	 all	 marketing	 of	
decaffeinated	coffee	has	 it,	a	coffee	 just	 like	regular	coffee	except	without	all	 the	caffeine.	
For	our	purposes,	 this	means	 that	as	opposed	 to	being	marked	by	 the	absence	of	 reality,	
which	 the	 fetish	 compensates	 for,	 decaffeinated	 coffee	 is	 a	 form	of	 reality	 that	 claims	 to	
harbour	 no	 sense	 of	 loss,	 lack	 or	 gap.	 This	 is	 the	 hyperreal.	 The	 coffee	 ought	 to	 be	
experienced	as	coffee	even	though	 it	 is	not	coffee	 in	 its	original	 form.	We	should	note,	as	
well,	 that	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 coffee	 in	 its	 original	 form	 literally	 ceases	 to	 exist.	
However,	the	original	becomes	irrelevant	since	the	‘copy	is	no	longer	a	copy’	(Baudrillard	
2005,	 68).	 Baudrillard’s	 point	 is	 that	 the	 original	 is	 no	 longer	 necessary	 for	 what	 is	
considered	 to	be,	what	ought	 to	be,	 a	 real	 rather	 than	 fake	experience.	 In	 fact,	 simulated	
coffee	 might	 possibly	 become	 the	 model	 against	 which	 the	 authentic	 taste	 of	 coffee	 is	
defined.	From	 this	perspective,	decaffeinated	coffee	 is	a	 simulation	 that	 is,	perhaps,	 even	
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more	 real	 than	 the	 real	 (the	 authentic	 taste	 and	 the	benefits	 of	 antioxidants	without	 the	
effects	of	caffeine!).		
The	correct	formula	is	thus	not	the	cynical	‘they	know	it	but	they	are	doing	it	anyway’,	it	is	




and	commodities.	The	original	gets	 in	 the	way	of	 the	authenticity	 that	 is	produced	 in	 the	
more	real	than	real	hyperreal.	He	writes:		
…	we	 immediately	 substitute	 a	 copy	 –	 the	 only	 version	 appropriate	 to	 our	
universe,	 where	 every	 original	 constitutes	 a	 potential	 danger	 and	 all	
singularity	 runs	 the	 risk	 of	 hindering	 the	 free	 circulation	 of	 value.	 …	 We	
secretly	prefer	not	to	be	confronted	with	the	original	any	longer	(1994b,	75,	
76).	
The	 illusion	Žižek	 locates	 on	 the	 side	of	 belief,	 as	 opposed	 to	 knowledge,	 thus	makes	no	
sense	 in	 the	 Baudrillardian	 formula.	 For	 Baudrillard,	 the	 key	 point	 is	 that	 despite	
simulation,	and	even	possibly	because	of	it,	practices	are	considered	to	be	real.	This	means	
that	 any	 slippage	between	knowledge	of	 the	original,	 if	 I	may	be	permitted	 to	put	 it	 this	
way,	 and	 the	 fetish	belief,	 or	 the	 copy,	 collapses.	As	Baudrillard	puts	 it,	 ‘it	 is	 not	 illusion	
which	conceals	reality.	It	is	reality	which	conceals	the	fact	that	there	is	none’	(1997b,	90).	
It	 is	 precisely	 the	 disturbed	 relationship	 between	 the	 original	 and	 copy	 that	 helps	 us	
understand	the	phenomenon	of	Trumpism.	As	I	have	suggested,	Trump	reveals	the	truth	of	
the	 system.	 Politics	 today	 is	 not	 grounded	 in	 an	 immutable	 reality.	 This	 claim	 does	 not	
mean,	I	must	point	out,	that	Trump	is	somehow	defendable	and	redeemable.	After	all,	does	
he	not	 show	us	 the	 truth	of	 the	 system!	And	 it	 also	does	not	mean	 that	we	might	 argue,	
along	 with	 Žižek,	 that	 Trump	 is	 much	more	 preferable	 than	 what	 would	 have	 been	 the	
duplicitous	inertia	of	Clinton	(Žižek	2016).	The	claim	here	is	that	the	virtue	of	Trump,	if	any	
can	be	found,	is	that	he	might	possibly	 ‘awaken’	the	fractured	left.	In	other	words,	he	is	a	
true	 enemy,	 a	 real	 (in	 the	 sense	 of	 rupture)	 producer	 of	 antagonism.	 If	 we	 take	 the	
perspective	 of	 Baudrillard,	 the	 key	 point,	 one	 that	 might	 overlap	 with	 Žižek,	 is	 that	
Trumpism	takes	the	form	of	obscenity.	However,	in	the	current	conjuncture	this	obscenity	
does	not	open	up	the	potential	for	a	truer	form	of	left	politics.	What	the	scandal	of	Trump	
does	open	up	 is	 the	shifting	terrain	of	 the	hyperreal.	There	are	key	aspects	of	 the	Trump	
phenomenon	 that	 suggest	 a	 deeper	 analysis	 is	 required,	 one	 that	 cannot	 simply	 be	
undertaken	 via	 concepts	 of	 the	 hyperreal.	 We	 now	 need	 to	 turn	 to	 a	 discussion	 on	
Baudrillard’s	account	of	integral	reality,	as	he	calls	it.		
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widespread	 fascination	with	 reality,	 which	 seem	 to	 be	 purposefully	 overstated.	 As	Mike	
Gane	suggests,	 ‘Baudrillard	 is	one	of	 the	very	few	thinkers	to	have	taken	Althusser’s	own	
conception	 of	 philosophy	 at	 all	 seriously’	 (2015,	 28).	 This	 he	 explains,	 citing	 Althusser,	
comes	in	the	form	of	an	injunction	to	‘think	in	extremes	...	which	means	within	a	position	
from	which	 one	 states	 borderline	 theses,	 or,	 to	make	 thought	 possible,	 one	 occupies	 the	
place	 of	 the	 impossible’	 (ibid.).	 As	 such,	 we	 can	 read	 Baudrillard	 as	 an	 extreme	 thinker	
attempting	 to	 shake	 critical	 thought	 away	 from	 its	 complacency	 with	 respect	 to	 the	
disappearance	of	the	real.		
I	 want	 to	 turn	 now	 to	 consider	 post-truth	 and	 Trumpism	 more	 closely,	 in	 the	 light	 of	
Baudrillard’s	 statements	 about	 integral	 reality.	 It	 would	 be	 tempting	 to	 understand	 the	
Trumpism	 scandal	 as	 a	 clash	 between	 postmodern	 hyperreality	 and	 objective	 reality.	
However,	I	think	this	misses	the	mark.	Trumpism	has	emerged	in	a	context	in	which	reality	
is	 troubled.	The	 fact	 that	newspapers	announce	 this	 in	precisely	 these	 terms	—	as	 in	 the	
recent	Guardian	headline,	 ‘In	 the	 heat	 of	 the	 political	 battle,	 objective	 reality	 is	 having	 a	
tough	run’	(Lewis,	2017)	—	is	a	clear	indication	that	the	reality	is	under	siege.	If	we	follow	
the	Twitter	storm	and	pundit	opinion	pieces,	with	which	the	current	discussion	begins,	the	
clear	 solution	 is	 to	 speak	 truth	 to	 power.	 Facts,	 it	 would	 seem,	 serve	 as	 a	 corrective	 to	
ungrounded	 and	 corrosive	 effects	 of	 post-truth	 and	 the	 Trump	 regime.	 This	 corrective	
strategy,	however,	misses	 the	mark,	and	perhaps	even	deepens	 the	battle	 lines	 that	have	
been	 produced	 by	 the	 troubling	 of	 the	 reality	 principle.	 My	 contention,	 following	
Baudrillard,	is	that	Trumpism	exposes	the	ungrounded	nature	of	the	political	system	itself.		
What	Trump	makes	explicit	has	 long	been	the	case	—	presidentiality	 is	 inseparable	 from	
media	 spectacle	 (Kellner	 2005).	 In	 fact,	 even	 the	 notion	 that	 actually	 existing	 politics	 is	
underpinned	by	an	objective	relation	to	a	world	of	facts,	as	opposed	to	ideology,	has	long	
been	challenged	(Edelman	1988,	Debord	1967).	Moreover,	Trump	also	makes	explicit	the	
direct	 link	 between	 the	 White	 House	 and	 corporate	 capitalism.	 Rather	 than	 operating	
through	 the	more	 opaque	 and	 indirect	 route	 of	 career	 politicians,	 capital	 has	 now	 taken	
direct	control.	The	opaqueness	of	behind	the	scenes	lobbying	and	party	donations,	and	the	
corresponding	 political	 lip	 service	 declaring	 governance	 for	 all,	 has	 given	 way	 to	 the	
transparency	and	obscenity	of	Trump,	 the	corporate	chauvinist.	 I	want	 to	argue	 that	 this	
shift	from	the	opaque	to	the	transparent	is	a	symptom	of	integral	reality.	Of	course,	in	the	
specific	 case	of	Trump	 it	 could	be	 that	 this	 shift	 is	 by	no	means	permanent.	The	opaque	




see	 here.	 Nevertheless,	 Trumpism,	 I	 think,	 provides	 us	 with	 an	 important	 glimpse	 of	 a	
possible	obscene	corporate	future,	which	may	already	exist.		
Integral	reality	stems	from,	what	I	have	been	calling	the	reality	compulsion.	The	production	










If	 in	 simulation	 the	 referent	 –	 reality	 –	 is	 a	 compulsively	 produced	 effect	 of	 the	 sign,	 in	
integral	reality	the	illusion	of	reference	disappears	altogether	and	the	sign	itself	becomes	
the	 referent.	 Today	 we	 have	 lost,	 he	 maintains,	 ‘the	 sign	 and	 artifice	 and	 are	 left	 with	
absolute	reality’	 (2005,	67).	What	this	means	 is	 that	 instead	of	standing	 in	 for	an	outside	
object,	as	in	reality	and	hyperreality,	the	sign	itself	ends	up	becoming	the	object.	In	other	
words,	the	artifice	of	referentially	that	characterised	the	sign	has	been	eliminated.	All	that	
remains	 is	 a	 functional,	 instrumental	 sign,	 or,	 perhaps	 more	 accurately,	 the	 virtual	 or	
informational	 sign.	 With	 integral	 reality,	 crisis	 gives	 way	 to	 the	 relentless	 positive	
production	of	meaning.	The	sign	no	longer	simulates	a	dual	relationship	with	the	referent,	
it	is	the	referent.	The	world	is	thus	completely	programmable.	In	it	‘everything	is	realised	
and	 technically	 materialised	 without	 reference	 to	 any	 principle	 or	 final	 purpose’	
(Baudrillard	1993b,	18).	Baudrillard	writes:	
We	 have	 found	 ourselves	 confronted	with	 the	 undertaking	 of	 realising	 the	
world,	of	making	it	become	technically,	integrally	real.	Now,	the	world,	even	
freed	 from	 all	 illusion,	 does	 not	 lend	 itself	 at	 all	 to	 reality.	 The	 more	 we	
advance	 in	 this	 undertaking,	 the	 more	 ambiguous	 it	 becomes,	 the	 more	 it	
loses	 sight	 of	 itself.	 Reality	 has	 barely	 had	 time	 to	 exist	 and	 already	 it	 is	
disappearing	(2005,	17).	
The	 crucial	 point	 here	 is	 that	 it	 is	 not	 Trumpism’s	 fakeness	 or	 authenticity	 that	 is	 the	
problem.	Against	 the	 assumptions	 of	 his	 supporters,	 Trump	 is	 not	 a	 cynical	 subject	who	
blusters	 in	 public	 and	 then	 performs	 real	work	 behind	 the	 scenes	 (this	would	 surely	 be	
preferable).	There	is	nothing,	no	true	self,	behind	the	Trump	mask.	His	pronouncements	do	
not	refer	to	a	referent,	they	are	the	thing	itself.	He	is	convinced	that	there	is	no	distinction	
between	 what	 is	 pronounced	 and	 reality.	 In	 fact,	 reality	 and	 pronouncement,	 from	 this	














learned	 to	 trust	 my	 instincts	 and	 not	 overthink	 things.	 ...	 Whenever	 I’m	




the	subject	of	 this	corporate	 integral	reality.	Firstly,	 this	 is	a	chauvinist	subject	 for	whom	




for	whom	sole	and	visionary	 ideas	are	both	necessary	and	powerful.	The	 task	 is	 to	avoid	
the	 trap	of	 compromise	and	unwaveringly	convince	others	 that	 their	visionary	 ideas	are,	
indeed,	unstoppable.	Here	the	subject	must	be	a	fundamentalist,	of	sorts.	Purged	from	any	





the	 thought	 of	 the	 visionary	 and	 the	 world.	 The	 world	 is	 and	 will	 be	 as	 the	 corporate	
chauvinist	 imagines	 it	 to	 be.	 In	 fact,	 corporate	 image	 management	 and	 branding	 is	 an	
‘elusive	transparency’	in	which	it	is	impossible	to	demarcate	the	difference	between	image	
and	world.	Branding	works	without	 irony	via	signs	with	no	referent,	signs	that	no	 longer	
simulate.	 The	 brand	 is	 the	 image	 and	 the	 image	 is	 the	 brand.	 For	 Trump	 ‘this	 elusive	
transparency,	 which	 separates	 us	 definitely	 from	 the	 real,	 is	 as	 unintelligible	 as	 is	 the	
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no	 to	 his	 regime’s	 shock	 tactics	 is	 simply	 not	 enough.	 Klein	 argues	 that	 a	 credible	 and	
captivating	 counter-plan,	 a	 yes,	 for	 the	 future	 is	 both	 urgent	 and	 necessary.	What	might	
Baudrillard’s	work	contribute	to	the	shape	of	such	a	future?	Firstly,	from	the	Baudrillardian	




post-truth	 and	 Trumpism	 are	 scandalous.	 Trump’s	 disregard	 for	 facts	 has	 produced	 a	
politics	that	is	caught	up	in	a	dangerous	illusion,	perhaps	delusion,	that	threatens	the	social	
fabric.	However,	 the	 counter-intuitive	 response	 from	a	Baudrillardian	perspective	 is	 that	
the	problem	is	that	illusion	has	been	dispelled.	The	scandal	of	Trump	is	that	he	is	under	no	
illusion	concerning	corporate	power	and	 its	capacity	to	transform	the	world.	Against	 this	
lack	 of	 illusion	 facts	 are	 a	 rather	 weak	 weapon	 (just	 as	 use-value	 in	 Marx	 is	 a	 limited	
critique	of	capital).		
Trump’s	 non-dual	 relationship	with	 the	world	 could	be	disrupted	by	 rediscovering	what	
Baudrillard	 calls	 the	 vital	 illusion.	 ‘If	 there	 is	 a	 secret	 to	 illusion’	 he	 writes,	 ‘it	 involves	
taking	the	world	for	the	world	and	not	for	its	model.	It	involves	restoring	to	the	world	the	
formal	power	of	 illusion,	which	 is	precisely	 the	same	as	becoming	again,	 in	an	 immanent	
way,	 a	 “thing	 among	 things”’	 (2008,	 90).	 It	 is	 precisely	 such	 a	 restoration	 that	 would	
disrupt	the	West’s,	Trump’s,	chauvinistic	tendency	to	dominate.	Instead,	the	subject	takes	
up	a	dual	relationship	with	others	and	the	world,	rediscovers	the	ethical,	the	ironic,	and	the	
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